When emerging pathogens encounter new host species for which they are poorly adapted, they must evolve to escape extinction. Pathogens experience selection on traits at multiple scales, including replication rates within host individuals and transmissibility between hosts. We analyze a stochastic model linking pathogen growth and competition within individuals to transmission between individuals. Our analysis reveals a new factor, the cross-scale reproductive number, that quantifies how quickly mutant strains increase in frequency when they initially appear in the infected host population. This cross-scale reproductive number combines with viral mutation rates, reproductive numbers, and transmission bottleneck width to determine the likelihood of evolutionary emergence, and whether evolution occurs swiftly or gradually within chains of transmission. We find that wider transmission bottlenecks facilitate emergence of pathogens with short-term infections, but hinder emergence of pathogens exhibiting cross-scale selective conflict and long-term infections. Our results provide a framework for a new generation of evidence-based risk assessment of emergence threats. 
Introduction
Emerging infectious diseases are rising in frequency and impact and are placing a growing 2 burden on public health and world economies [Jones et al., 2008 , Woolhouse et al., 2012b , Morse et al., 2012 , Howard and Fletcher, 2012 . Nearly all of these emergence events involve pathogens 4 that are exposed to novel environments such as zoonotic pathogens entering human populations from non-human animal reservoirs, or human pathogens exposed to antimicrobial drugs [Jones 6 et al., 2008] . In these novel environments, pathogens may experience new selective forces acting at multiple biological scales, leading to reduced replication rates within hosts or less efficient 8 transmission between hosts. When these novel environments are sufficiently harsh, emergence only occurs when the pathogen adapts sufficiently quickly to avoid extinction. As genetic sequencing of 10 pathogens becomes increasingly widespread, there are clear signs of such rapid adaptation [Steel et al., 2009 , Lowder et al., 2009 , Xu et al., 2014 , Jonges et al., 2014 , Zhu and Shu, 2015 , Lam 12 et al., 2015 , Xiang et al., 2018 ], but we lack a cohesive framework to understand how this process might work across scales. Theoretical studies have shed important insights into circumstances 14 under which this evolutionary emergence is possible, but either have focused on the host-to-host transmission dynamics and treated within-host dynamics only implicitly [Antia et al., 2003 , Iwasa 16 et al., 2004 , André and Day, 2005 , Park et al., 2013 , or have accounted for explicit within-host dynamics only along a fixed transmission chain [Peck et al., 2015 , Geoghegan et al., 2016b . Here, often are not dominated by single pathogen genotypes [Grenfell et al., 2004, Pybus and Rambaut, 2009] . Furthermore, at the host population scale, pathogen allele frequencies at a given locus 2 exhibit a range of dynamics from rapid selective sweeps for drug resistance or immune escape [Pennings et al., 2014 , Lim et al., 2007 , Kijak et al., 2017 ] to gradually changing 4 frequencies [Domingo et al., 2012 , Linster et al., 2014 . Together, these observations lead to the long-standing question of whether adaptive evolution of viruses occurs within single hosts by rapid 6 fixation of beneficial mutants, or more slowly by a gradual shift of allele frequencies along chains of transmission [Lemey et al., 2006 , Holmes, 2007 . A recent wave of studies tracking changes in 8 within-host genetic diversity through chains of transmission among hosts [Murcia et al., 2010 , Bull et al., 2012 , Hughes et al., 2012 , Stack et al., 2012 , Morelli et al., 2013 , Orton et al., 2013 , Vrancken et al., 2014 provide unique opportunities to address this question, but a theoretical framework is needed.
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Empirical studies, together with analyses at broader population scales, have highlighted the crucial influence of the transmission process -and particularly the population bottleneck 14 associated with transmission -in filtering viral diversity. The existence of transmission bottlenecks has long been recognized, and is hypothesized to play a critical role in pathogen 16 evolution [Duarte et al., 1992 , Bergstrom et al., 1999 , Novella et al., 1999 , Zwart and Elena, 2015 , McCrone and Lauring, 2018 , LeClair and Wahl, 2018 . Recent studies have reported that 18 bottleneck widths vary considerably among pathogens and routes of transmission [Varble et al., 2014 , Frise et al., 2016 , and perhaps across different phases of host adaptation [Moncla et al., 20 2016]. Narrow transmission bottleneck sizes of 1 to 2 viral genotypes are common for HIV-1 [Keele et al., 2008 , Tully et al., 2016 , Kariuki et al., 2017 and hepatitis C virus [Wang 22 et al., 2010 , Bull et al., 2011 , and bottlenecks of 1 to 3 viruses are reported for influenza in ferret respiratory droplet transmission experiments [Wilker et al., 2013 , Varble et al., 2014 2016] and in some studies of natural human transmission [McCrone et al., 2018] . Much wider bottleneck estimates, of 30 to over 100 viruses, have been reported for natural transmission of 26 influenza in horses [Hughes et al., 2012] , swine [Murcia et al., 2012] and humans [Poon et al., 2016 , Leonard et al., 2017 ; for ferret transmission experiments via direct contact [Varble et al., 2014 , Frise et al., 2016 ; and for transmission of Ebola virus among humans [Emmett et al., 2015] .
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A major frontier in understanding viral adaptation is how the transmission process influences evolution at population scales. Past work has emphasized the potentially deleterious effect of 4 genetic drift [Duarte et al., 1992 , Novella et al., 1999 , McCrone and Lauring, 2018 , but a rising tide of studies reports direct selection for transmissibility. This can arise as a strong selection bias 6 at the transmission bottleneck, where strains present at low or undetectable frequencies in the donor host are preferentially transmitted to the recipient [Boeras et al., 2011 , Wilker et al., 2013 , 8 Carlson et al., 2014 , Moncla et al., 2016 , or it can be measured directly via experimental infection and transmission studies [Hurt et al., 2010 , McCaw et al., 2011 , Imai et al., 2012 , Linster et al., 2014 ] (though we emphasize that enhanced transmissibility is not inevitable, and depends on availability of suitable adaptive genotypes [Zaraket et al., 2015] ). Overall transmission rates are 12 thus determined by total viral loads, weighted by genotype-specific transmissibilities [Carlson et al., 2014] . Importantly, the transmissibility trait can vary independently from viral replication 14 fitness within hosts, so there is potential for conflicts in selection across scales. Indeed, there is clear evidence that HIV-1 has certain genotypes that transmit more efficiently, but then the 16 within-host population tends to evolve toward lower-transmission strains during an infection [Shaw and Hunter, 2012 , Alizon and Fraser, 2013 , Carlson et al., 2014 2017]; a similar phenomenon has been reported for H5N1 influenza [Wilker et al., 2013] and H9N2 influenza [Sorrell et al., 2009] . In an extreme example, Plasmodium parasites were found to 20 rapidly evolve resistance to an antimalarial drug, but at the cost of complete loss of transmissibility [Goodman et al., 2016] . Experimental evolution studies have highlighted how 22 antagonistic pleiotropy can lead to tradeoffs between viral replication and the extracellular survival that is required for transmission [De Paepe and Taddei, 2006, Wasik et al., 2015] , and a 24 similar tradeoff has been postulated for environmental transmission of avian influenza in the field [Handel et al., 2013] . Together these findings contribute to a growing evidence base that 26 cross-scale conflicts in selection may inhibit the emergence of new viral strains in many systems (reviewed in [Park et al., 2013] ).
Collectively these empirical findings highlight the need for a theory of evolutionary emergence that accounts explicitly for the within-host dynamics of competing viral strains, transmission 2 bottlenecks, and host-to-host transmission dynamics [Gog et al., 2015] . To this end, we introduce and analyze a model which integrates previous work on stochastic models of evolutionary 4 emergence and deterministic models explicitly coupling within-and between-host dynamics [Antia et al., 2003 , André and Day, 2005 , Mideo et al., 2008 , McCaw et al., 2011 , Peck et al., 2015 Geoghegan et al., 2016b] . Our analysis allows us to address several fundamental questions about the emergence of novel pathogens: What factors limit evolutionary emergence for pathogens with 8 different life histories? Why do some apparently 'nearby' adaptive mutants fail to emerge? How do bottleneck sizes influence the likelihood of emergence? Do evolutionary changes occur swiftly within individual hosts, or gradually across chains of transmission? Moreover, our analysis allows us to examine the relative importance of genetic diversity in zoonotic reservoirs versus the 12 acquisition of new mutations following spillover into humans [Parrish et al., 2008 , Woolhouse et al., 2012a , Orr and Unckless, 2014 . Specifically, we address the long-standing question of how 14 much is emergence risk increased if the "spillover inoculum" includes some genotypes bearing adaptive mutations for the novel host? Finally, our analysis enables us to unify findings from 16 previous theoretical studies, and propose mechanistic interpretations of phenomenological parameters from earlier work.
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Models and Methods
Our stochastic multi-scale model of evolutionary emergence follows a finite number of 20 individuals in a large, susceptible host population exposed to a pathogen from a reservoir population ( Fig 1A) . Although our framework represents many types of pathogens and can be 22 extended to any number of strains, we focus on the case of a viral pathogen with two strains: a wild-type maladapted for the novel environment and a mutant strain potentially adapted for the 24 novel environment.
The cross-scale model with explicit within-host dynamics. In our model, described more transmission bottleneck) consisting of mixture of wild-type and mutant virions. The viral populations increase exponentially until saturating at time T e with a maximal viral load K at 2 which the viral replication rate is balanced by the viral clearance rate (Fig 1B) . The wild and mutant strains increase exponentially at rates, r w and r m , and mutations arise with probability µ.
4
The infectious period ends after T days. This within-host model can describe a range of viral dynamics from infections with primarily an exponential phase of viral growth to infections 6 maintaining a stable viral load for an extended period.
At the scale of the host population, the transmission dynamics along chains of hosts is 8 stochastic. Each infectious individual encounters a Poisson-distributed number of susceptible 8 individuals at a rate of β individuals per day. Encounters result in a transmission event with and assumes that all virions are equally likely to be transmitted from donor to host, i.e. no selection based on transmissibility.
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More formally, our model is a continuous time, age-dependent, multi-type branching process [Harris, 2002, Athreya and Ney, 2004] . The "type" of individual corresponds to their initial 22 viral load, and the "age" of an individual corresponds to the time since their initial infection.
Within an infected host, the viral dynamics determine how the viral load and composition changes 24 over time due to competition between strains and mutation events. Transmission events are determined by the viral load and composition of the host and, consequently, are age-dependent.
Due to ultimately large viral loads, the within-host dynamics are modeled with coupled differential equations where v(t) = (v w (t), v m (t)) denotes the vector of viral abundances The number of contacts of an infected individual during the infectious period is Poisson distributed with mean βT . On the event of a contact at t days after becoming infected, the 6 probability of transmission is p(b w v w (t) + b m v m (t)). On the event of transmission, the probability of infecting an individual with a viral load ofṽ = (ṽ w ,ṽ m ) withṽ w +ṽ m = N equals
Under these assumptions, during their infectious period, an infected individual of type v (0) infects a Poisson distributed number of individuals with viral loadṽ and the mean of this 10 distribution equals
Methods. To solve the probabilities of emergence, we use the discrete-time branching process 12 given by censusing the infected population at the beginning of each generation of infection. This discrete-time process is known as the embedded process [Harris, 2002, Athreya and Ney, 2004] .
14 All the statistics of this embedded process are given by the probability generating map 
The i-th coordinate of
is the probability of extinction by generation t when there is initially one infected individual with initial viral load (i, N − i). The probability of emergence is given by 1 − q where q = lim t→∞ q(t) 2 is the asymptotic extinction probability. The limit theorem of branching processes implies that q = (q 0 , . . . , q N ) is the smallest (with respect to the standard ordering of the positive cone), 4 non-negative solution of the equation q = G(0, . . . , 0).
For the numerical work, we used linear, logarithmic, and saturating functions for the 6 transmission probability function p. strain whose reproductive number R m is greater than one, there is a chance for a major outbreak.
The mutant strain might have a higher reproductive number than the wild-type strain because it
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replicates more rapidly within the host or because it transmits more effectively to new hosts (or both). We define these within-host and between-host selective advantages as s = r m − r w and
Consistent with theoretical expectations, a non-zero probability of evolutionary emergence 26 requires the mutant's reproductive number R m to be greater than one (Fig 2) . However, the Parameters: K = 10 7 , βT = 30, T = 7.5 < 12.9 = T e (short-term infection) and T = 30 > 12.9 = T e (long-term infection), b w chosen so that R 0 = 0.75 for wild type, r w = 1.25 and µ = 10 −7 .
mixture of selective advantages or disadvantages of the mutant strain that give rise to R m > 1 depends in a complex manner on the pathogen's life history traits, such as the duration of the 2 infection (Fig 2A,B vs. C,D) and the transmission bottleneck width (Fig 2A, C vs. B, D) . Notably, for long-term infections with a large transmission bottleneck size, the emergence probability can 4 be effectively zero (i.e. < 10 −16 ) for mutant strains whose reproductive number exceeds one (white region bounded by the solid red curve in Fig 2D) .
6
To understand these complexities, we determine the conditions under which the mutant's reproductive number R m exceeds one, and then present analytic approximations for the emergence 8 probability when R m > 1.
Cross-scale selection and the mutant reproductive number R m . The reproductive 10 numbers of the wild-type strain (R w ) and mutant strain (R m ) can be calculated as the product of the contact rate, the average transmissibility of the strain during the infectious period, and the approximately by a factor of e sT more than the wild-type, and transmission for a mutant virion is exp(τ ) more likely than for a wild type virion. Refining this intuition, we derive the
This approximation shows that a sufficiently strong selective advantage at either scale can result in the mutant reproductive number exceeding one (R m > 1) despite a selective disadvantage at 2 the other scale (confirmed by exact calculations in Fig 2A,B) . For short-term infections where viral dynamics are dominated by the exponential phase, the longer the duration of infection, the 4 greater the influence of the within-host selective advantage compared to the between-host selective advantage (e.g., steep contours in Fig 2A) .
For long-term infections, the viral load will tend to K for both purely wild-type or purely mutant infections. Thus, the only difference will be in transmissibility and we get the
This approximation implies that a between-host selective advantage is required for evolutionary 14 Going beyond the mutant reproductive number. When the mutant strain has a reproductive number greater than one, there is a non-zero probability of a major outbreak that is First, the size of the minor outbreak produced by the wild type determines the number of opportunities for the mutant strain to appear within a host. The average size of this minor outbreak equals 1 1−Rw , as noted by earlier studies [Antia et al., 2003 , Iwasa et al., 2004 . If the wild strain is badly maladapted (e.g. R w < 1/2), then it is expected not to spread to multiple implies that higher contact rates, within-host viral growth rates, viral transmissibility, and maximal viral loads (for long infectious periods) facilitate these larger reproductive values. short-term and long-term infections. For short-term infections where sT is small, there is insufficient time for the frequency of mutants to rise within a host, so transmission events with 18 mutant virions are rare (< 1/1, 000 for all black contour lines in Fig 2A,B) . This is a key obstacle to evolutionary emergence in short-term infections. In contrast, for long-term infections where the 20 mutant strain has a substantial within-host selective advantage, the mutant strain is transmitted frequently (e.g. the expected number of events > 1 for some contours in Fig 2C,D) .
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Finally, even if the mutant strain is successfully transmitted, an individual infected with the mutant strain needs to give rise to a major outbreak -the third term of equation (4). This For short-term infections, the cross-scale reproductive number α is equal to the ratio of the 8 base reproductive numbers:
Thus for short-term infections there is no additional condition required for emergence. Whenever 10 the mutant reproductive number R m exceeds one, there is a mean tendency for the mutant strain to increase in frequency once it has been successfully transmitted to susceptible individuals (i.e.
12
α > 1 because R m > 1 > R w ). The greater the ratio R m /R w , the more rapid the increase in frequency.
14 For long-term infections, there is sufficient time for within-host selection to change the frequency of the mutant strain within a host. Larger transmission bottlenecks increase the 16 likelihood that these changes in frequency are transmitted between hosts. For these long infectious periods and larger bottlenecks, a within-host selective disadvantage reduces the cross-scale 18 reproductive number α (Appendix):
Hence, the cross-scale reproductive number α may be less than one even when the mutant 20 reproductive number R m is greater than one. This phenomenon, which arises from the interplay of dynamics at within-host and between-host scales, moderated by the transmission bottleneck 22 width, explains the puzzling behavior about the emergence probabilities noted earlier (the white region bounded by solid and dashed red lines in Fig 2D) . 
Figure 3. Frequency dynamics of the mutant strain in the host population. For longterm infections with moderate to large transmission bottlenecks (N > 5), individualbased simulations corresponding to three values of the cross-scale reproductive number α illustrate (A) the mutant strain decreasing in frequency (despite an index case initially only infected with the mutant strain) when the cross-scale reproductive number α is less than one, (B) a gradual sweep to fixation of the mutant strain when α ≈ 1, and (C) fast sweeps to fixation for large values of α > 1. In these individual based simulations, each horizontal line marks the infectious period of an individual whose infection was initiated with that percentage of the mutant strain and the vertical arrows represent transmission events between individuals. In the bottom half of the figure, the mean field dynamics corresponding to each of the individual-based simulations are plotted as cobwebbing diagrams. The solid black curves correspond to the expected frequency of the mutant strain in the infected host population in the next generation given the frequency in the current generation. Thin blue lines indicate how the expected frequencies change across multiple generations. The colored backgrounds represent the expected number of individuals infected with a certain percentage of the mutant strain (vertical axis) by an individual with an initial percentage of the mutant strain (horizontal axis). Lighter colors correspond to higher values. Parameter values as in Fig 2D indicated with black asterisks.
The importance of these frequency dynamics can be visualized via individual-based outbreak simulations, and cobwebbing diagrams summarizing the mean field dynamics. When the mutant 2 reproductive number R m is greater than one but its cross-scale reproductive number α is less than one, mutant virions may be transmitted but the resulting mixed infections are invariably taken 4 over by purely wild-type infections (Fig 3A) . Only pure mutant infections can escape this "relapse" to wild-type, and then only if the mutation rate µ is low enough that new wild-type 6 virions are slow to appear. When the within-host selective disadvantage is weak and the between-host selective advantage is strong, the cross-scale reproductive number may be slightly 8 greater than one and the mutant strain can drift to higher frequencies within the infected host population (Fig 3B) . For large within-host selective advantages, the cross-scale reproductive 10 number is large and the mutant strain can sweep rapidly to fixation in the infected host population (Fig 3C) . Thus, in addition to revealing a new condition needed for evolutionary 12 emergence, the cross-scale reproductive number α summarizes the conditions under which evolution occurs swiftly or gradually within chains of transmission.
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The dueling effects of transmission bottlenecks. Wider bottlenecks increase the likelihood of evolutionary emergence for pathogens with a short infectious period, but can hinder or 16 facilitate evolutionary emergence of long-term infections (Fig 4A,B) . For short-term infections, evolutionary emergence is constrained primarily by the transmission of mutant virions by 18 individuals initially infected with only the wild strain. Wider transmission bottlenecks alleviate this constraint, especially when the mutant strain is expected to increase rapidly within the 20 infected population (α 1; Fig 4A) . When the mutant strain rises slowly in the infected host population (α slightly greater than one), the emergence probability is insensitive to the bottleneck 22 size, regardless of infection duration.
For long-term infections for which the mutant strain's reproductive number R m is greater than 24 one, but the cross-scale reproductive number α is less than one, emergence probabilities decrease sharply with bottleneck size (Fig 4B and Appendix) . Because a mutant reproductive number R m 26 greater than one requires a between-host selective advantage (τ > 0) for a long-term infection, the cross-scale reproductive number α is less than one only if there is a within-host selective Figure 4 . Effects of bottleneck size and mixed infections of the index case on evolutionary emergence of short-term and long-term infections. Different curves correspond to different tendencies, as measured by the cross-scale reproductive number α, for the mutant strain to increase in frequency in the infected host population. In (A) and (B), bottleneck size has negative effect on emergence when the cross-scale reproductive number α is less than one and a positive effect when α is greater than one. In (C) and (D), index cases initially infected with higher percentages of the mutant strain are more likely to lead to emergence. −∞ corresponds to numerical values of 10
or smaller. Parameters: K = 10 7 , βT = 150, T = 7.5 for short-term infections and T = 30 for long-term infections, b w chosen so that R 0 = 0.75 for the wild strain, r w = 1.25, τ = 1, s chosen to achieve the α values reported in the legend, and µ = 10 −7 . N = 25 in (C) and (D).
disadvantage (s < 0) so that mixed infections tend to be taken over by the wild-type.
Consequently, the mutant virus can start an epidemic only when a host is infected with mutant 2 particles only, an event that becomes increasingly unlikely for larger bottleneck sizes N .
Mutant spillover events hasten evolutionary emergence. When the mutant strain is circulating in the reservoir, the index case can begin with a mixed infection which invariably 2 makes evolutionary emergence more likely (Fig 4C,D) . For short-term infections, spillover doses that contain low or high frequencies of mutants have a roughly equal impact on emergence, and 4 the magnitudes of these increases are relatively independent of the cross-scale reproductive number α (Fig 4C) . This arises because the initial production and transmission of the mutant 6 strain is the primary constraint on evolutionary emergence for short-term infections with R m > 1 (black contours in Fig 2A,B) . Consequently, mutant spillover events of any size are sufficient to 8 overcome this constraint.
For long-term infections, the impact of mutant spillover depends on the cross-scale reproductive 10 number α. When α is less than one, only spillover doses with high frequencies of mutants have a significant effect on emergence (i.e. bottom three curves in Fig 4D) . When the cross-scale 12 reproductive number α is greater than one, the effect mimics short-term infections and mutant spillover events of any size can substantially increase the chance of emergence (top three curves in steps to evolutionary emergence (Fig 5) and four ingredients that govern these steps: (i) the reproductive number of the wild type which determines the size of a minor outbreak of this strain,
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(ii) the rate at which individuals infected initially with the wild-type strain transmit the mutant strain, and (iii) the cross-scale reproductive number which corresponds to the mean number of 26 mutant virions transmitted by an individual whose initial infection only included one mutant
Step 1: Wildtype strain spills over into novel host
Step 2: Minor outbreak of wild-type strain Major barrier when:
Basic reproductive number of wild-type strain (R w ) much less than one
Step 3: First transmission of mutant strain
Major barrier when:
Infectious period is short OR infectious period is long and within-host selection favors wild-type (s<0)
Step 4: Increase in frequency of mutant strain Major barrier when:
Basic reproductive number of mutant strain (R m ) less than one OR bottleneck is wide, infectious period is long, and within-host selection favors wild-type (s<0) wild strain mutant strain analyzing these ingredients of evolutionary emergence, we show how the probability of emergence is governed by selection pressures at within-host and between-host scales, the width of the 6 transmission bottleneck, and the infection duration. We also map the conditions under which different broad-scale patterns are observed, from rapid selective sweeps to slower diffusion of new 8 types. While our study has focused on within-host and between-host scales of selection, it could be generalized readily to other types of cross-scale dynamics where selection may act differently at 10 different scales, such as within-farm and between-farm scales where genetic data have given insights into the emergence of high-pathogenicity avian influenza strains [Fusaro et al., 2016] .
Previous studies of evolutionary emergence of pathogens [Antia et al., 2003 , Iwasa et al., 2004 , André and Day, 2005 , Park et al., 2013 et al., 2003 et al., , Iwasa et al., 2004 showed that under these conditions the probability of emergence is proportional to the frequency of these events, which they bundled together into a 8 phenomenological "mutation rate".
In conclusion, our cross-scale analysis identifies the mechanistic counterpart to this 10 phenomenological "mutation rate", which is the probability that an individual infected initially with the wild-type strain ends up transmitting at least one virion of the mutant strain (Step 3 in role, and our analysis showed that achieving this first transmission of the adaptive mutant is a key 22 barrier to evolutionary emergence for short-term infections (Fig 2A,B) . This finding aligns with the recent observation that putative immune-escape mutants of pandemic H1N1 influenza, which 24 should have a within-host fitness advantage, were generated readily in infected humans but did not reach high within-host frequency and have been detected very rarely at the consensus level
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(i.e. they have failed to emerge) [Dinis et al., 2016] . While more investigation is needed to determine the relevant s and τ parameters for these strains, these data are consistent with the mechanism we identify whereby these variants may be adaptive but have insufficient time to reach high enough frequencies to avoid being lost in transmission bottlenecks.
2
Our analysis highlights an additional factor, the cross-scale reproductive number α, previously unrecognized in models neglecting within-host diversity and analyses centered on R 0 for pure 4 infections. Even after the mutant strain has been transmitted, it needs to increase in frequency at the scale of the infected host population (Step 4 in Fig 5) . Specifically, each transmitted mutant 
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The directionality of the positive feedback is more complex, and depends on multiple factors including the infection duration and the presence or absence of cross-scale conflicts. For long-term 20 infections, mutant frequencies can drop deterministically within a host, and hence prevent emergence, even if the mutant strain has a reproductive number greater than one. This occurs 22 when the mutant strain has a within-host selective disadvantage and between-host selective advantage (upper left quadrant of Fig 2D) ; the long infectious period allows time for the 24 within-host disadvantage to drive the mutant strain to lower frequency and, thereby, set up the positive feedback effectively preventing evolutionary emergence. In contrast, for short-term 26 infections the mutant strain tends to rise in frequency whenever the mutant reproductive number is greater than one, because there is insufficient time for any within-host disadvantage to act. In particular, evolutionary emergence may occur despite within-host selective disadvantages, a possibility excluded by previous theory [Park et al., 2013] (Fig 2B,D) . Related to this result, Geoghegan et al. [2016b] found that longer durations of the infectious period would lower the probability that a donor would infect the recipient. In their 6 case, this occurred because fitness of the mutant was assumed to be lower in the donor host species and higher in the recipient species. Hence, a longer infectious period could purge any 8 mutants arising in the donor and result in the recipient only receiving wild-type virions.
Our cross-scale analysis enables us to address two long-standing and interrelated questions in emerging pathogen research, regarding the influence of transmission bottleneck size on emergence probability and the importance of "pre-adapted" mutations circulating in the animal 12 reservoir [Parrish et al., 2008 , Pepin et al., 2010 , Gog et al., 2015 , Woolhouse et al., 2012a , Orr and Unckless, 2014 , Geoghegan et al., 2016b . In both cases, the answer depends on the 14 cross-scale reproductive number α that governs the frequency feedback. Under most circumstances, wider bottlenecks boost the probability of emergence (Fig 4A,B) , because they fitness losses due to genetic drift and the effects of Muller's ratchet [Duarte et al., 1992 , Bergstrom et al., 1999 , Novella et al., 1999 , McCrone and Lauring, 2018 , LeClair and Wahl, 2018 , which 24 become more severe for narrower bottlenecks. Contrary to these negative effects of narrow bottlenecks, our findings highlight that narrower bottlenecks can aid emergence in long-term infections with a cross-scale conflict in selection (Fig 4B) . Here the adaptive gain in transmissibility at population scales can be impeded by the selective disadvantage at the within-host scale, but, intriguingly, this disadvantage is neutralized by genetic drift arising from narrow bottlenecks. Given the evidence for cross-scale evolutionary conflicts for HIV-1 [Shaw and particularly for long-term infections (Fig 4C,D) . If the cross-scale reproductive number α is greater than one, so that the mutant frequency rises easily in the infected host population, then 8 even low frequencies of mutants in the reservoir lead to substantial risk of emergence. Indeed, for long-term infections with α > 1, emergence becomes almost certain when there are mutants in the initial spillover inoculum. Conversely, when the cross-scale reproductive number is less than one, emergence probability scales with the proportion of mutants in the initial dose, and when α 1,
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the initial dose must consist almost entirely of the mutant strain in order to pose any major risk.
These findings yield direct lessons for the growing enterprise of conducting genetic surveillance on 14 zoonotic pathogens in their animal reservoirs [Russell et al., 2012 , Davis et al., 2014 , Watanabe et al., 2014 , Carroll et al., 2018 . A crucial prerequisite for genetic surveillance is knowledge of 16 genotypes of concern; the integration of various research approaches to address this question, and estimate key quantities, is an on-going research challenge [Russell et al., 2014 , Geoghegan et al., 18 2016a , Lipsitch et al., 2016 . Risk to humans increases if there is any non-zero proportion of mutant viruses in the spillover inoculum, so tracking the presence of such mutants is beneficial.
20 Surprisingly, the quantitative frequency of mutants in the initial dose has little impact on emergence probability in most scenarios, with the one exception of long-term infections with 22 α < 1. Collectively, these results suggest that any knowledge of the cross-scale reproductive number and mutant reproductive numbers can help to refine our goals for genetic surveillance, 24 and that in many circumstances presence/absence detection is sufficient.
While there are not sufficient data from past emergence events to test our model's conclusions, , and much tighter bottlenecks at the key juncture in host adaptation when a genotype with greater transmissibility is available to be selected. If this hypothesis is correct, then our findings can be applied to each adaptive step independently, and may help to identify which viral traits are most crucial to adaptive steps subject to tighter or looser bottlenecks.
2
Our results focus on systems where there is one major rate-limiting step to emergence, and the viral population can be represented by one wild-type and one mutant strain. This is a 4 simplification of most viral emergence problems, but will apply directly to systems where a single large-effect mutation is the primary barrier to emergence of a supercritical strain, as for 6 Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus emerging from rodents to horses [Anishchenko et al., 2006] .
While it is possible to extend our exact computations and analysis of the cross-scale reproductive 8 number to systems with multiple mutational steps, the present analysis already provides insights into more complex evolutionary scenarios. For evolutionary trajectories that proceed through a 10 fixed series of genotypes, the probability of emergence can be approximated by extension of our equation (4), as in previous work [Antia et al., 2003 , Iwasa et al., 2004 , Park et al., 2013 . If 2016], alternative genotypes that yield similar phenotypes [Moncla et al., 2016] , and the costs imposed by deleterious mutants on higher mutation rates [Loverdo and Lloyd-Smith, 2013] .
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Our analysis also focuses on a simple "logistic-like" model for within-host viral dynamics. This simplification allows us to study how evolutionary emergence is limited by different factors for Biological Sciences, 272:1949 -1956 , 2005 . 
When the within-host dynamics saturate (i.e. N exp(r i T ) > K), the basic reproductive number
where T e = log(K/N )/r i is the length of exponential phase and T s = T − T e is the length of saturated phase.
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We derive two approximations of R i under the assumption that s is small, exp(r i T ) 1, and K N . First, assume that the infection is short-term in which case T e = T . Then provided s is 10 sufficiently small to ensure that the mutant type doesn't saturate, R i are given by (A-1). The log ratio, provided exp(r i T ) 1, satisfies
which yields (2) in the main text. Now assume that the infection is long-term in which case T e < T , and that if s < 0, |s| is sufficiently small to ensure that the mutant type also saturates before time T . Then the basic
Assume that |s| r w . Then
As T = T s + T e and
it follows that 4 log R m R w ≈ τ + log 1 + s r w r w T e − 1 1 + r w T s .
As log(1 + x) ≈ x for small x and |s| r w by assumption, we obtain
Equation ( 
where V w (t), V m (t) are the solutions to
Ignoring back mutations (i.e. setting r m µ = 0 and r m (1 − µ) to r m ), the solutions for
are approximately
if r w = r m , and
if r w = r m = r. Since x a+x ≈ x/a to first order near 0, the weighted frequency, x m (t), of mutant strain is approximately
if s = 0, and
For ≥ 2, these terms are of order µ 2 and therefore will be ignored. Hence, the only term of interest is = 1:
We also can approximate (assuming p is differentiable)
We drop the O(µ) term as it will only lead to higher order terms in the approximation.
4
Putting all of this together gives the following approximation for the mutant force of infection
In the case of a linear transmission function p(x) = x, we can write down explicit expressions 8 for (A-3) and (A-4). There are two cases to consider. First suppose that N exp(r w T ) ≤ K i.e. the infection is short-term. Then, integrating and simplifying yields the following approximation for 10 the mutant force of infection
Assuming r w s (and thus r w /(r w + s) 1 − s/r w ),
if s = 0 and Fig 2D, this approximation works quite well away from this limit.
Appendix-6
We begin by approximating the mean initial mutant viral count in individuals infected by an individual with V w (0) = N − and V m (0) = . Recall, the force of infection for producing 2 individuals initially infected with j mutant viral particles is given by
is the within-host frequency of the mutant strain, and (v w (t), v m (t)) is 4 the solution of the within-host viral dynamics with initial condition v w (0) = N − , v m (0) = .
Weighting this term by j and summing over j yields the expected number of mutant viral 6 particles in an individual infected by our type (N − , ) infected individual:
Now if we let x = /N denote the initial fraction, then dividing the previous integral by the net 8 number of viral particles infecting new individuals yields our desired update rule
Note that h(x) is a function of x as the solution of (V w (t), V m (t)) depends on its initial condition
The points x = 0 and x = 1 are fixed points for h corresponding to a mutant-free and 12 wild-type-free states. Stability of the fixed point x = 0 is determined by for N 1. h (0) corresponds to α described in the main text and the final expression has the verbal interpretation given in the main text. Carrying out the integration, in general, is complicated by the fact that the time at which V w (t) + V m (t) = K has no explicit formula when s = 0 and, in general, this saturation time will 6 depend on x.
In the special case of short-term infections (i.e. there is only exponential growth), we get α is defined as h (0), which here is equal to η, thus for short-term infections, α = R m /R w .
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Since R w < 1 by assumption and R m > 1 is necessary for emergence, we always have α > 1 and so the frequency dependent dynamics at the scale of the host population can not significantly 
Appendix-8
For x close to 0, we have the time at which the dynamics saturate, T e , is given approximately by Let T s = T − T e and assume that T T e , T e where T e is the length of the exponential phase for an individual infected only with the mutant strain. Then Estimating the Probability of Emergence when α < 1. When α is less than 1, the 6 frequency of mutant virus decrease in an infected host, and consequently, even if the adapted virus may emerge, the probability of emergence is very low, and even lower when the bottleneck size, N , increases. Here, we provide an approximation for the emergence probability when α < 1, which explains why the probability of emergence decreases dramatically when N increases.
When the outbreak starts, the first individual is infected with wild-type only. When s < 0, the mutation-selection balance can be reached relatively quickly, and for s negative enough, the 12 proportion of mutant is small. So the probability to transmit at least one mutant is roughly equal to the probability to transmit one mutant, which is N exp(τ )r w µ/|s| where r w µ/|s| is the Last, an individual infected with mutant viruses alone has to lead to a successful outbreak, which happens at approximately the same probability than in the case with no back mutations, with probability p m . So overall, the approximation will be: 
